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In 1994, between 6 April and mid July, a period of 99 days of mayhem,
approximately 500,000-800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were slaughtered in Rwanda in
a systematically planned genocide. (Alison des Forges, who provides the only analysis of
numbers, suggests a figure of 507,000. Surprisingly, she does not take into consideration
the counts based on bodies found in burial sites and estimates of corpses that were thrown
into Lake Victoria. The latter produces a much higher total.) Like the Nazi Holocaust of
the Jews, the genocide was a highly organized and centrally directed one. As indicated in
2the famous 11 January 1994 cable that the UN Force Commander in the field, General
Romeo Dallaire, sent to UN headquarters four months before the genocide began in
earnest, the genocidists, based on their practice runs, calculated that they could kill 1,000
every 20 minutes. This was the only genocide since the Holocaust that had occurred on
such a scale. But it took place over three months and not three years. Largely executed
with machetes, it was a low tech affair, not a highly industrialized operation. Further,
there was plenty of information in advance that the genocide was being planned. What
most stands out, however, is that the genocide took place in a poor small country with a
UN military force present. That peace force continued to control the airport in the
Rwanda capital of Kigali throughout the civil war, a war that served as a semi-cover for
the genocide.
Why had the genocide occurred? Why had it not been prevented? Why, once it
started, had it not been mitigated? What roll did the outside "good guys" play in
preventing, mitigating or, perhaps, even facilitating the genocide?
These are major questions lurking behind the spate of recent books on the
Rwandan genocide. The UN was created after World War II, in part at least, to prevent
genocides. This was the most easily preventable genocide one can imagine. There was
advance notice. The UN was in military control of the key centre - the airport.
International law sanctioned intervention in the case of genocide and, in any case, the UN
had already been given a mandate to protect civilians in Rwanda. Finally, those
organizing the genocide were only a relatively small group, at most 400 people in the
extended extremist high command. Those executing the genocide were poorly equipped.
General Dallaire, in an interview with me, suggested that a well-equipped company with
armored personnel carriers and helicopters could have stopped virtually the whole
slaughter if the intervention had occurred at the right point. And even once the genocide
started, a well-equipped military battalion could have done the job. Why did we stand by
and do so little to stop or even mitigate the genocide?
Why did the genocide occur in the first place? Can we learn anything from the
Rwanda slaughter that can advance our knowledge of why genocides take place? Perhaps
then future ones can be anticipated and then prevented.
The UN sent troops in July 1994 to protect and save the refugees (including many
of the genocidists) who fled Rwanda when the Hutu extremists were defeated by the
Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). When the UN-sanctioned French troops of
Opération Turquoise landed in June on only several days notice, it was ten weeks after
the genocide had started and after it had almost run its course. Why had troops not been
sent earlier to stop and hamper the genocide?
One explanation is that we are morally at war ourselves. On one side stand the
morally righteous humanitarians who help refugees but have no control of military
forces. They berate the political powers for failing to do their duty. On the other side
stand the political realists who work for states that control military forces and frequently
argue that the only reason intervention is warranted is if our self interests or the balance
3of power are affected. In fact, the realists often argue that intervention is part of the
problem rather than part of the solution.
There are, of course, philosophers like Michael Walzer, who claim that the above
two options pose a false dichotomy. What is needed is a principled conception of politics
and an application of principle to crises that takes politics fully into account. Elsewhere, I
have dubbed that approach as humanitarian realism. The "thin" universal morality that
unites all humanity has to be combined with the "thick" history and culture particular to
the various peoples, including ourselves, that populate this globe and which nations stand
ready to defend.. (Cf. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and
Abroad, Notre Dame University Press.) The application of such a moral outlook is
particularly acute when it comes to Rwanda, for the Tutu and the Hutsi practice the same
religions, have the same culture, speak the same language and, with the exception of
some members of each group, most are physically indistinguishable. The conflict
between the extremist Hutu and the rest of the Rwandan population was over the "thin"
morality which supposedly unites all humanity rather than over the "thick" cultural
differences which divide peoples. On the level of 'truth' and 'justice' minimally
understood, most people in Rwanda and in the West shared the same values. However, on
the level of "thick" morality, Rwanda was not a place where one could find a "return of
the tribes", an assertion of particular ethnic, religious and national identity that has
become so much a sign of our times.
However, "the return of the tribes" was the lens through which most of the media
misread the conflict in Rwanda. There was no intractable differences between the Hutu
and Tutsi. Yet this was the context where such a horrific and preventable genocide took
place. The conflict was not between those with different "thick" cultures". On one side
stood a small determined group manipulating identities without even significant cultural
differences in the name of what Professor Melissa Orlie of the University of Illinois has
called "unmixed difference" or "the desire for purity". On the other side of the "thin red
line" stood the rest of us who recognize that purity is a delusion inappropriately applied
from physical hygiene to issues of identity.
Though one might expect a wide variety of interpretations, the books discussed in
this essay offer variations on only a few explanations to account for both the genocide
and the failure to intervene in a timely and effective fashion. One answer is moral
bankruptcy. It is taken as self-evident that the genocidists were morally bankrupt. One
does not expect to read that the organization that led the intervention and its members are
also morally bankrupt. But this is precisely the charge laid by the Canadian Force
Commander of the peacekeepers in Rwanda. General Romeo Dallaire, in his essay, "The
End of Innocence: Rwanda 1994" in the Moore collection, saw himself and his UNAMIR
forces as "attempting to balance moral concerns with practical considerations" in the
Walzer spirit. The sovereign states who are members of the UN, on the other hand, not
only abandoned the Rwandese, but even abandoned its own emasculated UN forces to
face the  tragedy without a mandate, without military equipment to defend themselves (let
alone the Tutsi being slaughtered) and without supplies. The survival rations were rotten
and inedible. What is Dallaire's explanation? The states suffered from an "inexcusable
4apathy", "inexcusable by any human criteria" and "completely beyond comprehension
and moral acceptability." In other words, the depth of moral depravity was more in
evidence and more incomprehensible when the treatment of their own troops was put
under the microscope, for even self interest was not in play. This was already evident in
the radical difference between the complex and desperately critical crisis that the troops
were asked to deal with and the totally inadequate resources that they were given to
accomplish their task. It was also evident in the fact that "70 percent of my and my
principal staff's time was dedicated to an administrative battle with the U.N.'s somewhat
constipated logistic and administrative structure" than with the crisis they were sent over
to address. Dallaire doesn't detail that logistic nightmare in his essay, but one example
should suffice. The troops were sent over and never received a budget to cover
expenditures until six months after they were sent and only two days before the genocide
exploded.
Apathy that is morally and cognitively incomprehensible is one interpretation of
the moral failure of the West and the international agency that is supposed to embody our
highest values - the UN. Tom Longman ("State, Civil Society & Genocide in Rwanda" in
the Joseph collection) has a different explanation. It was not apathy and moral
indifference in not stopping the genocide but the involvement of western states in
building state power that carried out the genocide. The West allowed the growth of a
militant opposition to seize state power at the expense of the civil society. Gourevitch
holds the same view. "Rwanda was regarded in much of the rest of the world as the
exemplary instance of the chaos and anarchy associated with collapsed states. In fact, the
genocide was the product of order, authoritarianism, decades of modern political
theorizing and indoctrination, and one of the most meticulously administered states in
history." Not apathy, but a strong and activist state structure without a counterbalancing
civil society, all reinforced by Western economic support - these were the conditions that
fertilized the ground for the genocide.
Like virtually all the scholars who have studied the Rwandan genocide, Longman
observed that the problem was not the result of a release of primordial tribal divisions as
a result of a failed or weakened state. Rather, "the genocide was organized by state
officials and their allies and was carried out using the instruments of the state." The West
with their support of the Habyarimana regime made possible the increased coercive
capacity of the state. And the civil war was not only the cover for the genocide. The civil
war allowed the regime to expand its weaponry and military personnel, to monitor and
more effectively control the population and to organize and carry out criminal violence
with rhetorical resources. (Presumably, this refers to Radio Milles Collines and the
variety of extremist newspapers that led the racist propaganda campaign against the
Tutsi.) The logistics were, in effect, supplied by western support. In initiating the civil
war, the RPF bears some of the responsibility for the genocide in Longman's view,
particularly since, without the war, Longman believes that Rwanda was headed towards
increased democratization. But that does not mean that democratization would have
included the repatriation of the refugees who initiated the war.
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creating what he dubs "structural violence". Most of the book is spent documenting that
structural violence in contrast to the image of Rwanda perpetrated by the aid agencies as
the ideal recipient of aid until the late eighties. Rwanda had been portrayed, certainly by
CIDA, as the best user of aid (for example, relatively little of the Rwandan state funds
went to the military) until the crash of coffee prices in the late eighties. Though he cannot
spell Ottawa when he indicts Canada (he spells it Ottowa), Gourevitch puts the case
succinctly. In the eighties, "Rwanda was tranquil - or, like the volcanoes in the northwest,
dormant; it had nice roads, high church attendance, low crime rates and steadily
improving standards of public health and education [though Unwin claims it was very
unevenly distributed]. If you were a bureaucrat with a foreign-aid budget to unload, and
your professional success was to be measured by your ability not to lie or gloss too much
when you filed happy statistical reports at the end of each fiscal year, Rwanda was the
ticket."
In the Galtung tradition, structural violence entails conditions which offer
radically different life chances to different groups because there is "great inequality,
injustice, discrimination, and exclusion needlessly limiting people's physical, social and
psychological well-being." Those in charge of or attached to the state sector enjoyed
enormous privileges. Most were poor, suffering economic and social exclusion. They
lacked information, education, or access to health services and other basic needs in spite
of the macro-indicators that registered economic growth in the eighties. Structural
violence results in frustration, anger, ignorance, despair and cynicism because the images
of the good life turn the poor into self-haters without self-respect so they become
vulnerable to manipulation and simplistic ideas. The civil society committed to
moderation, pluralism and tolerance was weak. At the same time, development aid
strengthened the state sector without any effective or persistent countervailing political
conditionality placed on that aid or sufficient counter-balancing efforts to reinforce the
civil society or, in the end, adequate provision from the donor countries for its
peacekeepers. That is the argument, in any case.
Unvin unites the thesis of Dallaire and Longman, but treats their observations as
symptoms of a deeper problem. On the one hand, the wealthy countries did not provide
either a mandate or sufficient resources to intervene effectively in the genocide. On the
other hand, aid was part of the process creating the conditions for structural violence
when that same aid could have been used to prevent its possibility or to counteract its
effectiveness once it became immanent. As Uvin documents, when conditionality was
placed on aid, the Rwandan government did temporarily change its behaviour. Rather
than apathy among donor states, the issue then is one of misplaced support to those who
were themselves under threat of losing their power and privileges and susceptible to
employing scapegoating strategies to deal with stress and lack of self esteem. As
Gourevitch put Helen Fein's manipulation/revenge thesis as the root of genocide, "The
specter of an absolute menace that requires absolute eradication binds leader and people
in a hermetic utopian embrace, and the individual - always an annoyance to totality -
ceases to exist." When combined with a lack of external constraints, a recipe for disaster
had been created.
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earlier colonial efforts that reified differences between Tutsi and Hutu and created the
basis for the construction of rigid ethnic divisions. Further, Weiss documents the huge
expenditures in aid following the genocide. This economic support stands in such sharp
contrast to the meagre effort provided to the peacekeepers and the mis-directed aid prior
to the outbreak of civil war. For Weiss, the problem was not apathy or even a misdirected
aid ideology, though the latter sewed the conditions for the civil war and the ethnic
skapegoating.. Rather, the focus is on the peacekeeping and its failure when the warnings
of genocide were present or even once the genocide had commenced. The tardiness and
meagerness in responding is rooted in domestic politics according to Weiss. "There are
fewer risks for politicians from humanitarian assistance, however costly and inefficient,
than from earlier preventive action by military forces with possible casualties or the
potential for protracted involvement in a civil war."
Elliott Leyton also accepts the thesis that genocide is the use of violence by those
who hold power in a modern state to "galvanize its citizens, divert public attention from
the regime's defects, steal the victim's wealth and status, and terrorize the survivors into
submission". Leyton's book begins after most of the others left off - the mass return of the
refugees from Zaire in 1996 when they are freed from the clutches of their oppressors -
the genocidists - by the Rwandan-backed rebellion in Zaire. The book includes pictures
of the skeletal remains of the genocide in the Nyarama church. States seemed so
unwilling to risk the lives of armed soldiers to prevent or mitigate the genocide. Leyton's
book is a personal account of doctors and medical personnel of Médecins Sans Frontières
(Doctors Without Borders) who voluntarily accept risks to their health and well-being,
and sometimes their lives. Leyton does not portray them as heroes but as individuals
motivated by relatively mundane reasons. They needed jobs. They were bored with just
dispensing pills to the secure and overfed. They liked adventure. According to Martin, a
Canadian 10 year veteran of MSF, MSF's historic and ethical responsibility "is first to
bear witness to these genocides and famines for the world, then to help, and finally to
assess more efficient ways of getting aid to the suffering."
Though the book appears to include nothing about prevention and concentrates on
documenting, helping and providing humanitarian assistance, in fact, Martin accepts the
Galtung/Unwin thesis that humans deprived of needs and dignity bear grudges and are
bent on revenge. MSF tries to reduce the need for vengeance. Though of various
backgrounds and skills, and pushed by a variety of different motives, what seems to unite
MSFers is that they are free spirits, impatient with bureaucracies as they build their own
in order to be effective. As Leyton observes, "MSF is hierarchical and is "run along
military lines" in spite of the sincere effort to be consensual and participatory. Repelled
by the impersonalism of modernity, for Leyton, MSF volunteers are searching for
disalientation.
Membership [in MSF] liberates them as human beings, allows them to explore fully their
potential as they seize the opportunity to act. With that liberation comes a profound
conviction of purity of what they do, of the moral superiority of their agency and
themselves - a belief so powerful, a satisfaction so intense, that it sustains them through
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wounds, to dig the latrine or deliver clean water are all part of a process in which they
confront reality and construct their identities. In acting thus with such purpose and moral
clarity, all other dilemmas dissolve. To act without ambivalence or regret, to cut through
the mindlessness of conventional life, to revel in what one does is ofr them the only way
to become whole. (p. 72)
As distasteful as I found the idea, I could not help reading this and
thinking about the search for purity and meaningfulness of the genocidists. They,
too, had a sense of moral superiority and were willing to take great risks and face
atrocities - ones they, of course committed, however. They too had a sense of
purpose and moral clarity in their own terms. But the MSFers were dedicated to
doing good, mending the world, while the genocidists were intent on committing
evil and destroying others. What line differentiated the two groups? What unites
them?
Gourevitch has an answer. Or, at least, the Hutu, Paul, has one and his
explanation reads as if Gourevtch endorses it. The genocidal leadership
"understood that in order to move a huge number of weak people to do wrong, it
is necessary to appeal to their desire for strength - and the gray force that really
drives people is power. Hatred and power are both, in the different way passions.
The difference is that hatred is purely negative, while power is essentially
positive; you surrender to hatred, but you aspire to power. In Rwanda, the orgy of
misbegotten power that led to the genocide was carried out in the name of
Hutuness, and when Paul, a Hutu, set out to defy the killers, he did so by
appealing to their passion for power: 'they' were the ones who had chosen to take
life away and he grasped that that meant they could also choose to extend the gift
of retaining it." A simple answer. Power is creative. Power is misbegotten when it
is motivated by hatred and then used destructively.
But then why did the genocidists engage in hatred. And why did western
states contribute to a system that fostered such hatred and then did virtually
nothing when that misbegotten power was used to destroy a million people? Peter
Unwin claims to offer a deeper answer. The genocidists are victims of the process
of modernity from the perspective of a neo-Marxiist critique. If the genocidists
are the victims of modernity, the humanitarians are the saviours. MSFers are in
search of liberation from "the triviality and mindlessness of modernity"
performing righteous penance for what Leyton calls "the machinations of racist
imperialism" in a world run on fear and greed and a tissue of lies. While
genocidists act on the basis of resentment, MSFers combine "self-serving desires
and the needs of suffering humanity." But then their satisfaction is totally
dependent on a horrific world and, unconsciously, to obtain any satisfaction, it
would mean they had a vested interest in perpetuating misery. Isn't that an
obscene thought?
Leyton's book is a propaganda spiel for the dedicated and committed
humanitarians of MSF. They deserve to be applauded. James Orbinski, an MSF
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the dedicated medical and other personnel who serve with MSF do not need the
silly asides on the nature of the world derived from a simplistic leftist view of the
its current state that Leyton provides. The combination suggests that the author is
using MSF sacrifice and dedication to advance his own purist vision and the sense
of ecstasy he obtains with such moral clarity.
I have the same sense in reading Philip Gourevitch's interviews with the
survivors of the genocide, though his account is by far the best written of the
books under discussion. But he is another moralist on a superego trip, only his
moral purity is not found in the humanitarians in MSF, but in. Paul Kagame, the
real leader of the RPF and current Vice-President of Rwanda. Widely and justly
praised for capturing the horror of the genocide in Rwanda through the voices of
the survivors, Gourevitch also provides an intellectual horror show in his own
right. Though he does recognize the simplicity and moral absoluteness of the
genocidists, he seems to be totally oblivious to his own simplifications and
puritanism. If MSFers are intent on giving witness and healing, Gourevitch
focuses on the witnessing largely by letting the victims speak.
Further, unlike the moral purists who speak with a pre-modern voice,
Gourevitch speaks with a post-modern one. "Rwandan history is dangerous," he
says. "like all history, it is a record of successive struggles for power, and to a
very large extent power consists in the ability to make others inhabit your story of
their reality." In fact, this is Gourevitch's definition of freedom. Freedom belongs
in the imagination. "We are, each of us, functions of how we imagine ourselves
and of how others imagine us." Insofar as others project an image onto us, we are
entrapped by their projections. We are free only insofar as we have freedom to
imagine ourselves. As Gourevitch advises gratuitously, "perhaps you will want to
guard the memory of those times when you were freer to imagine yourself as the
only times that are truly and inviolably your own." But since this schema provides
no basis for differentiating truths from lies, the issue is not the lies of the state, but
the narrative the state projects. "When death is always the work of enemies, and
the power of the state considers itself in concert with the occult, distrust and
subterfuge become tools of survival, and politics itself becomes a poison."
But if freedom is merely the function of how we imagine ourselves, then
the genocidal leaders are most free when they imagine the Tutsi are all out to
murder them and they see themselves engaged in a rite of purification. Similarly,
when the UN Secretariat imagines itself to be governed by reluctant and
unsupportive states, then apologist UN officials can assert of the famous 11
January cable that, "We get hyperbole in many reports…If we had gone to the
Security Council three months after Somalia, I can assure you no government
would have said, 'Yes, here are our boys for an offensive action in Rwanda..'"
Gourevitch feels no reportorial responsibility to check whether the cable was, in
fact, treated by the UN Secretariat as just another hyperbolic report. Evidence had
already been published that the UN did not regard this as just another false alarm
9before Gourevitch wrote his series of New Yorker articles which constitute the
book.
But Gourevitch is not a researcher. He is just an interviewer and story
teller. Otherwise, he would have known that when Iqbal Riza suggested that the
cable was seen as an expression of hyperbole, it was not, in fact, viewed as such
at the time. Gourevitch notes, without comment, that Riza looked surprised. "Its
astonishing - an amazing document." But the UN Secretariat had recognized the
cable for the astonishing document that it was from the beginning. After the
genocide, they had engaged in a cover-up. And Riza's feigned surprise was
possibly part of the same cover-up.
Thus, though Gourevitch is great story teller, he is a lousy investigative
journalist. And when he offers interpretations of historical events, he is downright
self-contradictory and confused. For example, Gourevitch tells the following
story. In May of 1994, there was a threat by a military intelligence officer of the
genocidal regime to kill all the Tutsi and moderate Hutu who had taken sanctuary
in the Hotel Milles Collines. The Hotel manager called on all his contacts to lobby
with the regime. Those taking sanctuary in the hotel were not killed. Why not?
Gourevitch's explanation is that UNAMIR facilitated a deal between the RPF,
who held government prisoners, and the government. There was trade-off. The
RPF would spare their prisoners if no one in the hotel was killed. In other words,
two coercive powers faced each other and made a bargain facilitated by
UNAMIR. The latter, according to Gourevitch, had not saved the refugees as
widely reported at the time; rather, "they were saved by the RPF's threat to kill the
others."
I do not know what all the factors were that saved those who had taken
refuge in Hotel Milles Collines. I do know that Gourevitch presents his answer
with total self assurance and without evidence. And the fact that this realist,
power politics account seems to contradict his major theme not only does not
phase him, he seems to be utterly oblivious to that fact. While Gourevitch is a
great story teller, he has little interest in separating out fiction from truth. In fact,
his post-modernist outlook makes such discrimination largely irrelevent. And his
explanations, and the moral blame he distributes so easily based on those
simplistic explanations, are as much a mixture of fiction as truth.
For example, Gourevtich says that, "The desertion of Rwanda by the UN
force was Hutu Power's greatest diplomatic victory to date, and it can be credited
almost single-handedly to the United States." It is certainly true that the US
wanted to avoid another Somalia and was wary of becoming involved in the midst
of a civil war. The US also deliberately chose to call the massacres 'genocide-
like'. However, the French journalists were keen to portray France as the key
accomplice of the genocidists. Further, if the Belgians had not decided to
withdraw their troops in response to the mutilation and killing of ten
peacekeepers, if they had not lobbied that everyone else should withdraw, the
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crisis over UNAMIR would not have been up for discussion. If the UN Secretariat
had properly informed the Security Council of the warnings of the planned
genocide, premptive steps might possibly have been taken.
The reality is that there were many actors and all played their respective
parts in the disaster. But tellers of fables are prone to love a genre which focuses
on the irresponsible cops (in this case, the USA), the simple hero who takes direct
action (Paul Kagame) and a horrific villain - the genocidists. Further, the reading
of the Genocide Convention as enabling rather than legally obligating intervention
is not "an inventive new reading" by the USA, but is one of the standard
interpretations. It is peculiar how the person who believes that freedom is merely
a product of how we imagine ourselves is so quick to see everyone else's views
that disagrees with his own as being not only a product of their imaginations, but
a totally unwarranted one.
Gourevitch does not restrict this treatment to the USA even if he holds the
US to be virtually singularly responsible for the genocidist successes. He engages
in the same sort of judgement when it comes to France. When he discusses
Opération Turquoise, the French intervention in July of 1994, he says that,
"wherever they went, the French forces supported and preserved the same local
political leaders who had presided over the genocide." regarding the RPF as their
enemy and the Hutu genocidists as the legitimate power. The fact that the
foremost authority on French action in Rwanda, Gérard Prunier, provides a quite
different account, is of no interest to Gourevitch even though he credits Prunier in
his acknowledgements.
But Gourevitch has not written an academic book. Do not read it for
adequate explanations and judgements. They are the distractions for those who
have a detailed knowledge of the genocide. Read it for providing the best taste
and feel and horror of the genocide from a very humanistic and sensitive
perspective. The problem is that when you turn to an academic account such as
that of Klinghoffer, you have a tightly written and extremely well footnoted
account of the international role in the genocide, but, unfortunately, it too is
marred by a plethora of errors. Some are trite. Bruce Jones, though completing his
PhD at the London School of Economics, is a Canadian and not a British
specialist. The almost one million "refugees" displaced by the civil war prior to
signing the Arusha Accords are not refugees at all but internally displaced. The
famous Dallaire cable was dated the 11th not the 10th of January. Some errors,
however, are much more serious.
His account of UNAMIR is flawed in a number of respects. First, the
evidence does not support any claim that Boutros Boutros Ghali was "determined
to strengthen UNAMIR" except after the end of April. Though the statement
appears at the appropriate time, there is no qualification that this was a reversal of
an earlier position. Further, in the introductory chapter, Klinghoffer openly states
that Boutros-Ghali worked persistently in New York to organize collective action.
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This is demonstrably false, though Boutros-Ghali and the documents he had the
UN issue would want you to draw precisely this conclusion.
Earlier, Klinghoffer stated that UNAMIR, since its mandate did not extend
to protecting civilians, "kept a low profile as the violence escalated." First,
UNAMIR did have a mandate from the parties to the peace agreement to protect
civilians, but the UN determined that the mandate would only be carried out with
the cooperation of the gendarmie and Rwandan militarey forces, who happened at
the time to be controlled by the genocidists. The lack of a mandate was not the
reason for not protecting civilians. Rather UN headquarters determined that the
UNAMIR forces could not take an initiative in protecting civilians, though
soldiers did so actively at great risk and continued to provide passive protection at
several large locales, including the stadium in Kigali. The reasons were many.
This interpretation of the mandate was the result of other factors and not the
explanation for the limited action. Further, Klinghoffer claims that "UNAMIR
kept a low profile as the violence escalated." Trying to initiate a cease fire may
have been stupid and futile, but it was not maintaining a low profile. Organizing
the protection and exodus of the ex-pats in Rwanda perhaps should not have been
its primary task. But UNAMIR was not maintaining a low profile. Regrouping
and maintaining control of the airport was not maintaining a low profile.
UNAMIR did not confine its troops to barracks after the death of the Belgian
peacekeepers.
Part of the problem with Kinghoffer's account is that it suffers from
terseness. It is written as if the book is a series of notes strung together. But the
errors aside, it does string the key items together in an easily read account that is
well documented in its footnotes. It echoes the unanimous view of all these books
that the genocide was a systematically organized effort to eliminate the Tutsi
population in Rwanda by Hutu extremists. The international complicity in the
genocide is seen to result from the Belgian colonial legacy, foreign manipulation
of the economy and, Klinghoffer adds, the population pressure and "triage", the
use of elimination techniques to respond to population pressures. But if
Klinghoffer had read Homer-Dixon's study - Homer-Dixon is one of the major
proponents of the population and ecological pressure thesis as a prime cause of
conflicts in Africa - he would have seen that even the staunchest proponent of the
thesis found that the evidence in the Rwanda case did not support such an
interpretation.  Nevertheless, in spite of my differences with some of the factors
cited, Klinghoffer does try to explain the many and varied factors that interacted
to help bring about the conditions that fostered the genocide.
What are we left with in the end? The genocide was caused by immoral
Hutu extremists. The genocide was caused by a system that built in structural
violence. The genocidists were driven by hatred and revenge is a misbegotten use
of power. The major western powers failed to intervene because they were
complicit, to different degrees, in building the genocidal regime. Unwilling to
sacrifice their troops to save others, according to General Dallaire, the Dominant
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powers were quite willing to put troops in harms way to give the appearance of
action without the will or the moral fibre to do anything effectively.
I happen to find the range of explanations limited and too simplistic in
general. The reasons were more complex than even Klinghoffer suggests, and he
includes some factors that have little merit as explanatory ones. Nevertheless,
Unvin has written the best documented account of the economic factors behind
the genocide. Gourevitch has written a most moving and compelling account of
the feel and effects of the genocide. Klinghoffer has synthesized a large body of
material in a very concise way but one marred by too many errors of fact and
interpretation. The volunteers of MSF deserve a better written analysis of the
context of their self-sacrifice and dedication, though Leyton's praise is well-
deserved. And the chapters in other books make their own valuable contributions.
The problem is that not one of them is adequate in explaining and accounting for
both the genocide and the impotence of those who could so readily have saved the
day.
The best, longest and least simplistic book is saved for dessert: Alison des Forges'
Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. One of "a small number of foreigners
[who] did fight passionately to stop the slaughter," Alison, modest beyond belief about
her own role (her own name does not even appear on the cover of the book), proves that
intellect can complement passion.
Alison provides one of the briefest and best histories of the emergence of Hutu
and Tutsi as distinct groups. The bureaucratization of differences, the solidarity of the
oppressed and the opportunism of an elite combined to turn those differences into radical
divisions. Alison describes in meticulous detail how Bugosora outfoxed the internal
opposition within the army and the political establishment to pull off both the coup and
the genocide. Though the RPF has to be credited with saving most of the Tutsi who
survived, Alison goes into great detail in the role of the RPF in committing atrocities of
its own - from 25,000 to 40,000. If Dallaire did not spell out the UN logistic nightmare,
Alison does. And Alison is the first to document how our own head of the Canadian
Armed forces, General Baril, then at UN Headquarters, continually undermined his
fellow Canadian, General Dallaire. However, Alison does claim, erroneously I believe,
that the UN representative accepted Bagosora's efforts to install his puppet extremists as
the legitimate government following the coup. Her evidence indicates only that he failed
to report on the extent and organized nature of the genocide underway.
Unlike Gourevitch, she checks her facts and recognizes that the 11 January cable
was put in a black file (actually, a box) because it was recognized as important. Alison
confirms the accuracy of Gourevitch's account of how the Tutsi were saved in the Hotel
Milles Collines, but she leaves out the heroic genre for framing the tale. Her explanations
are subtle and complex. Her emphasis is on the West's failure to stop the genocide once
that state power was seized to be used for genocidal purposes - an outcome far more
contingent and uncertain than suggested by the other accounts. For Alison agrees with
Dallaire, and explains in excruciating detail the reasons that the genocide could have been
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stopped with ease in the first two weeks after it had commenced. Unlike Gourevitch,
Alison not only distributes the responsibility for failing to prevent or mitigate the
genocide, but explains the different motives for the various failures. Belgium was
concerned with extricating its peacekeepers with a minimum of dishonour. The US was
unwilling to commit resources in a country without strategic interest. France concentrated
on protecting its clients and Francophonie. The UN leadership was preoccupied with not
being blamed for another failure.
 Alison presents reams of evidence to suggest that the specter of the Tutsi as an
absolute menace requiring eradication was a strategic technique rather than a given
psychological state binding Hutu leaders and followers. Far more organizational skill and
effort were required to execute the genocide than simply repeated appeals. In fact, state
machinery, the use of the media for propaganda purposes, intimidation and coercion of
dissidents or those who tried to stand aside, all were used brilliantly and efficaciously.
Yet only a significant but small portion of the population, in the end, were induced or
forced into killing their co-nationals. And they did so for many more reasons than Leyton
suggested - not only power and pillage, but virulent hatred, real fear, ambition, and to
save their own skins or for more mundane reasons - they wanted to avoid the fines levied
for non-participation.
Why had the genocide not been prevented or mitigated? Many reasons combined
and came together, but none of the reasons excused those who had a role. Alison would
have the bystanders as well as the perpetrators brought before a commission of truth if
not a court of justice. She has been the strongest and now establishes herself as the most
articulate force in advancing the effort to bring understanding as well as justice to the
Rwanda genocide.
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